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Abstract
Common privacy enhancing technologies fail to effectively hide certain statistical aspects of encrypted traffic, namely individual packets
length, packets direction and, packets timing. Recent researches have shown that using such attributes, an adversary is able to extract various
information from the encrypted traffic such as the visited website and used protocol. Such attacks are called traffic analysis. Proposed
countermeasures attempt to change the distribution of such features. however, either they fail to effectively reduce attacker’s accuracy or
do so while enforcing high bandwidth overhead and timing delay. In this paper, through the use of a predefined set of clustered traces
of websites and a greedy packet morphing algorithm, we introduce a website fingerprinting countermeasure called TG-PSM. Firstly, this
method clusters websites based on their behavior in different phases of loading. Secondly, it finds a suitable target site for any visiting
website based on user indicated importance degree; thus providing dynamic tunability. Thirdly, this method morphs the given website to the
target website using a greedy algorithm considering the distance and the resulted overhead. Our evaluations show that TG-PSM outperforms
previous countermeasures regarding attacker accuracy reduction and enforced bandwidth, e.g., reducing bandwidth overhead over 40% while
maintaining attacker’s accuracy.
Index Terms—Traffic Analysis, Website Fingerprinting Countermeasure, Encrypted Traffic Morphing,Website Clustering
I. INTRODUCTION
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks leverage the shortcom-
ings of common privacy enhancing technologies (PET) such
as SSH, SSL and Tor in order to infer the visited website of a
monitored user (MU). Such PETs employ different encryption
techniques in order to preserve the privacy of users. However,
they fail to effectively hide or obfuscate features such as packets
length, packets direction and packets timing. Using these coarse
features, an attacker is able to perform WF attacks and gain
insight into website, which user is visiting or has already
visited.
The mentioned PETs shortcomings are due to the fact that
WF attacks inspect network traffic in a different abstraction
level compared to usual PETs. Hence, they are able to
reveal some information that common PETs are expected to
hide in the first place. This difference in abstraction level
inspection is caused by the PETs failure to hide at least one
of the following traffic feature classes: packets length, packets
direction, packets timing ,and packets sequence. Furthermore,
each feature class can be represented in different granularities,
forming a hierarchical order, e.g. packets form flows, flows
form objects, objects form traces ,and so on. WF attacks use
such features in different abstraction and granularity levels to
model an interesting application behavior.
Although WF attacks have a fairly simple threat model,
recent researches [1]–[5] have shown that they are capable
of achieving high accuracy rates and pose serious threats to
online privacy of the users. Even with the presence of a PET
and a WF countermeasure, in 2012, Dyer et.al. [1] showed
that all such defenses either fail to reduce the accuracy of the
attacker to a satisfying measure or do so with high bandwidth
and/or timing overhead. For example, Dyer developed a simple
naı¨ve Bayes classifier trained with byte count in traffic bursts
as the sole feature. This classifier was able to detect the visited
website of a user with lower bound accuracy of 46% out of
128 websites.
The proposed defenses in this field, either change the
distribution of at least one class of traffic features [6] such as
random padding and exponential padding, or create uniform
traffic traces, aiming to limit the distinguishability between
different traffic instances, such as BuFLO [1] and TAMARAW
[4]. In addition, another type of defense belonging to the
first approach are morphing defenses [7]. Morphing defenses
change the distribution of features in a way that the observed
trace resembles another website. Defenses pursuing the first
approach use the means of padding and splitting in attempt to
obfuscate the real packets length of the loaded site, or utilize
application level features such as HTTP pipelining in HTTPOS
[8]. The main difference between morphing defenses and the
other ones, is that morphing defenses mislead the attacker while
the others confuse the attacker resulting in drop-in-accuracy
percentage (DiP). The second approach on the other hand,
limits the information leakage by uniformization, thus removing
the distinctive features among website traffic instances. Such
defenses are inspired by MixNets [9] and use uniform size
packets at predetermined and fix time intervals. Although
this approach provides better DiP than the previous defenses,
they suffer from high bandwidth and/or timing overhead [1].
High bandwidth overhead is problematic in bandwidth-starved
applications such as Tor and defenses with excessive timing
delays are not suitable for time-sensitive applications such as
chatting and mailing.
In addition, none of these defenses support dynamic tun-
ability. This means their relative DiP and overhead is tuned
once at the design phase. Moreover, changing these attributes
depending on the user input and/or the importance of the
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2Symbol Meaning
WF Website Fingerprinting
PET Privacy Enhancing Technologies
MU Monitored User
DiP Drop in Accuracy Percentage
WS Set of All Websites
TR Set of All Traces
TF Set of All Traces with Their Feature Space
Cand Set of All Candid Traces
IM Importance Measure
nClust Number of Website Clusters
To Initially Observed Trace by Attacker
Tsrc Source Website
Csrc Cluster of Source Website
Cdst Cluster of Destination Website
Tdst Destination Website
Tout Output Trace with Countermeasure Applied
CD Cluster Distance Matrix
CD[i, j] jth farthest cluster from cluster i
M Number of Slices for Trace Representation
SimThres Similarity Threshold
TABLE I
USED SYMBOLS IN THIS PAPER
given instance is not supported. This ability is particularly
important in scenarios where all websites are not equally
important to users. In such cases, the user might prefer to
avoid high overhead for a website, which is not important to
its privacy and vice-versa. In these scenarios, dynamic tunability
can help the user decide how important a particular website is
to his/her privacy and then tune the defense accordingly.
In this paper, we introduce a novel morph-based coun-
termeasure against WF attacks called TG-PSM. Unlike the
previous morphing defenses that only morph the packet size
distribution of the source site, TG-PSM analyzes the packet
sequence itself and morphs the size and timing of each packet
according to its greedy packet morphing function. TG-PSM has
two main components: (a) greedy morphing and (b) website
clustering. The greedy morphing component is in charge of
morphing the source website trace to the target website trace.
This morphing is done in a greedy manner, i.e., for morphing
each packet, the subsystem maximizes the goal function. This
function compares the relative DiP and enforced overhead
of morphing that particular packet. The second component,
website clustering, is in charge of choosing the appropriate
target site. For each given website that user wants to hide,
an importance measure (IM) is required. Based on the given
website and its IM, the subsystem chooses a cluster of websites
and extracts a random website from that cluster as the target
site. This difference of target site selection based on user input
provides TG-PSM with dynamic tunability. The contributions
of this paper are as follows:
• A greedy algorithm based on sequence morphing, which
provides packet morphing without requiring early distri-
bution of packets.
• A technique for presenting websites based on their
behavior in different phases of their traffic as well as
clustering them based on known cluster methods. Also,
we show the performance of each clustering method
using internal and stability measures and discuss the best
clustering algorithm for trace clustering.
• A dynamically tunable defense against WF attack is
introduced. This tunability is based on choosing the
appropriate cluster for target site based on the user
specified IM.
To evaluate our method (TG-PSM), we implemented 3
classifiers and 3 countermeasures from the literature and
compared them to TG-PSM based on their DiP and bandwidth
overhead. The classifiers include Liberatore and Levine’s
naı¨ve-Bayes [3], Herrmann’s multinomial naı¨ve-Bayes [10]
and Panchenko’s SVM classifier [5]. For countermeasures,
we chose the ones that have already shown effective DiP
against leading classifiers or related to TG-PSM family of
countermeasures. The countermeasures are Traffic Morphing,
BuFLO and TAMARAW. Our results show that in same
scenarios, TG-PSM performs better than the rest of the
countermeasures. It reducing bandwidth overhead by more
than 40% while it maintains the same DiP. Used symbols and
abbreviation in this paper are presented in Table I
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
and III cover preliminary concepts in WF field by reviewing
website fingerprinting attacks and feature class categorization,
respectively. In section IV, the related work of this field both
in attacks and defenses are presented. Section V, explains the
morphing algorithm and the process of finding the suitable
target website. Section VI, presents the evaluation results of TG-
PSM and compares the effectiveness and enforced bandwidth
of our method to other well known defenses against best-
performing attacks of this field. Section VII discusses some
important subjects in WF attacks and defenses as well as
practical considerations. Section VIII conveys our discussion
and provides concluding remarks.
II. WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS
WF attacks are considered as a subset of traffic analysis
attacks. In WF attacks, the threat model consists of a passive
attacker with the means to relate the observed traffic to a
user (MU). Attacker also has the ability to sniff the ongoing
traffic of the network. Because of the simplicity of the threat
model and the lightweight requirement for the attacker, WF
attacks are virtually undetectable, hence they can be categorized
into untraceable surveillance methods [11]. An attacker might
acquire the means to relate an observed traffic to a user if it
possesses one of the three following conditions: (a) the attacker
is local, (b) the monitored channel is used only by a single
user and (c) one of the nodes between client and server, which
knows the identity of the client, is compromised [12], [13].
This situation is possible in proxy servers with authentication
or entry node of a Tor circuit.
WF attacks consist of three steps [14]. In the first step, the
attacker specifies a set of interesting websites (WS). This set
includes the websites that the attacker is interested in knowing if
they are being visited. Then, the attacker browses such websites
in a similar environment close to the users. While browsing,
the attacker captures the data and stores it for further use (To).
In second step, the attacker creates a statistical model based on
3the To, which describes the traffic behavior while the website
is being visited. Here, the attacker might use various learning
algorithms or a conjunction of multiple algorithms in order to
create the model [14]. In the final step, the attacker sniffs the
ongoing traffic and matches the ongoing traffic pattern with
the patterns of the interesting websites. For any given traffic
trace, if the similarity of the trace to an interesting website
passes a certain threshold, attacker infers that MU is visiting
that particular website.
Consistent with previous researches, we consider the follow-
ing assumption in our framework:
• Attacker knows when a trace for a single website starts
and when it is ended. In the real world, this assumption
holds if MU injects a delay in between visiting of two
different websites.
• No other conflicting background activity exists at the
time of sniffing. This background activity should not
interfere with the website visit in the way that it confuses
the attacker, for example, into detecting that user is
downloading a file instead of loading a webpage. In
general, even multi tab browsing can be considered a
conflicting background activity. The result of multi-tab
browsing and some other important factors are discussed
in [15].
III. IMPORTANT TRAFFIC FEATURES
In order for the classifier distinguish between different
instances of website traffic, classifier needs a statistical model,
which accurately describes each websites behavior. As creating
a model based on raw traffic (only storing packet information)
have proven to be difficult and inaccurate, different classifiers
extract various features out of the traffic. Such features can be
categorized into these four classes: (a) unique packet length,
(b) inter packet timing, (c) packet sequence behavior and (d)
packet direction.
We define a packet as an ordered triplet of direction (-1 for
outgoing and 1 for incoming), ti as the absolute time difference
of this packet with the one before and size:
Packet pi =< diri, ti, sizei >
diri ∈ {−1, 1} and ti = (timepi − timepi−1)
A packet sequence as an ordered set of n packets each with
their own attribute:
PacketSequence PS =< p1, p2, . . . , pn >
A trace as an ordered pair of siteidj of which the trace belongs
to, and the packet sequence for that trace:
Trace tj =< siteidj , psj >
siteidj ∈WS and PSj ∈ PSs
A website as another ordered pair of siteidk and Trj as the
set of traces belonging to a specific website:
Website wsk =< siteidk , T rj >
Trj ⊂ TR
Based on this description, now we can define the four important
feature classes in WF attacks. Two traces ti, tj are different
regarding to their first class features if:
ti :< siteidi , psi > , tj :< siteidj , psj >
(∃pr ∈ psi | pr 6∈ psj) ∨ (∃pr ∈ psj | pr 6∈ psi)
Two packets of the same size in two different traces have
different arrival time (different regarding to the second class
of features) if:
∃ pp ∈ psi ∧ pq ∈ psj and size(pp) = size(pq)
SUM(th) 6= SUM(tu) where
th = {tph | 1 ≤ h ≤ p} and
tu = {tpu | 1 ≤ u ≤ 1}
Two packet sequence show different behavior regarding to the
same metric SM if:
SM(psi) 6= SM(psj)
For example if the SM represents the mean packet size across
first 50 packets of each trace:
MEAN(px) 6=MEAN(pz) where
px = {px ∈ psi|1 ≤ x ≤ 50} and
pz = {pz ∈ psj |1 ≤ z ≤ 50}
The use of packet sequence behavior features, can decrease
the dependency of attacks to the packet specific features thus
increasing the overall accuracy of classifiers in face of noise
and defense. Panchenko et. al. [5] used various packet sequence
features in their attack (they called these features markers).
IV. RELATED WORK
As the literature of this field is vast and diverse, we focus
on the related work which directly affect our approach or have
made significant improvements in this field.
A. WF Attacks
We categorize WF attacks based on their approach to simi-
larity measures and the type of learning algorithm they used1.
Using these two attributes, two main WF attack categories are:
feature attacks and distance-based attacks.
1) Feature Attacks: Feature attacks at best utilize only 3 of
the feature classes and leave out the packet sequence behavior
class. They use simple learning algorithm such as naı¨ve-Bayes
or Jaccard-coefficient [17]. Early researches in this area dates
back to early 2000s when Sun et.al. [6] analyzed log files of web
traffics and identified different websites based on their object
size. Though at the time this classifier performed well, new
modifications in HTTP protocol such as HTTP pipelining [18]
and browser design such as multiple concurrent connections
have made this attack insufficient. In 2006 Liberatore and
Levine [3] introduced two new classifiers. A Jaccard coefficient
and a naı¨ve Bayes classifier. Both of these classifiers focus on
unique packet length and ignored other feature classes. Both
1In [16] Wang et.al. has made a similar categorization, however, based on
different factors
4worked in closed world environment2 and only considered the
traffics which went through a SSH proxy. In 2009 Herrmann
et.al. [10] improved the work of Liberatore and Levine and
introduced a new classifier that used multinomial naı¨ve Bayes
algorithm and in addition to the unique packet lengths, also
considers the frequency of each packet. Herrmann classifier was
tested against various PETs at the time and with the exception
of Tor, it performed reasonably well. All of these attacks suffer
from their extensive focus on unique packet length feature class
and fail to comply with defenses that change these features.
This shortcoming is more apparent in situations with high noise
such as Tor. However, for comparability with the literature, we
use Liberatore and Levine (LL) classifier and Herrmann (HA)
classifier in our evaluations.
2) Distance-Based Attacks: Distance-based attacks usually
exploit either of these two main approaches. They either use
distance-based learning algorithms such as SVMs or string
distance measures such as OSAD and considered traffic traces
as strings. The first approach relies mostly on packet sequence
behavior class. The second approach on the other hand, doesn’t
extract features out of the traffic, instead creates a string out
of the observed packets. Most of attacks in this class focus
on attacking Tor streams because of their uniform packet
lengths. In 2011 Panchenko et.al. [5] introduced an SVM
classifier, which in addition of using packet length and timing
features, used various packet sequence metrics (which they
called markers) to better classify instances. This classifier
(PA) was one of the first to operate reasonably well in Tor
environments. In 2010, Lu et.al. [18] used levenshtein string
similarity measure and build a classifier specifically for Tor. Use
of string similarity metrics was also pursued in [4], [16], [19]
and some improvements was done on their speed and scalability.
In 2012 Cai et.al. [19] introduced DLSVM based on Damerau-
Levenshtein distance and uses an SVM learning algorithm.
Although they showed that DLSVM performs better the PA on
Tor traffic, however, in the case of normal traffic, PA performs
marginally better. In 2013 Wang and Goldberg [16] improved
on previous Cai et.al. classifier and introduced OSAD (optimal
string alignment distance). Even though OSAD showed high
accuracy even in Tor situations, however, its excessive training
time (608.000 CPU second for 100 websites 40 instances each)
is a major disadvantage. In 2014 Wang et.al. [20] introduced
k-NN classifier, which has 6 different feature classes and relies
on large datasets to find feature classes that defenses are unable
to hide.
B. WF Defenses
We study WF defenses based on six different evaluation
metrics. The first metric shows the OSI layer in which the
defense works. Defenses that only operate on network level
are restricted in using only network level utilities. They are
able to perform network-level modifications to traffic and are
application independent. On the other hand, layer 7 defenses
have the capability to use application level modifications that
in some cases increases their DiP. Another metric refers to the
2A discussion about close and open word environment is presented in section
VII
feature class(es) each defense is attempting to hide (OF(s)).
Intuitively, the more feature classes defense hides, the higher
DiP it has. The trade-off here is that hiding all of the classes
results in high overhead that is undesirable. Third metric is
determinism, which shows the predictability of Tout. If for
any reason the attacker learns the used defenses mechanism,
non-deterministic defenses can still operate while deterministic
defenses become predictable. Forth metric is tunability. This
metric shows the ability of a defense mechanism to tune its
relative overhead and DiP. If a defense is tuned once and
uses the same approach to all instances it has static tunability.
However if the defense mechanism can change its attributes for
each instance based on users input, it has dynamic tunability.
This feature is specially important in the case of bandwidth-
starved situations. In these scenarios, the user does not need
to tolerate high overhead for all its actions and can chose to
afford more overhead only for more important cases. The last
two metrics are bandwidth overhead and timing delay that both
are important in designing a useful and efficient defense.
In [21] Hintz et.al. proposed numerous countermeasures such
as random padding and pad to MTU, however, they showed
that those countermeasures were ineffective. In 2009 Wright
et.al. [7] proposed direct target sampling (DTS) and traffic
morphing (TM). Both of these defenses morphed the shape
of Tsrc and made it resemble another instance. The difference
was, while DTS used random target selection and morphed
the Tsrc, traffic morphing used convex optimization matrix
and morphed to Tdst with low bandwidth overhead. While
all previous countermeasures only used network level utilities,
in 2010 and 2011, Panchenko [5] and Luo [8] introduced
Camouflage and HTTPOS, respectively. Camouflage worked
by requesting multiple other websites while the actual website
was visited by the user to cloud the real traffic. HTTPOS on
the other hand used conjunction of application layer techniques
such as HTTP pipelining and network level such as TCP RTT
to reform the Tout. The most recent defenses such as BuFLO
and TAMARAW are inspired by high latency MixNets. These
countermeasures attempt to hide most distinctive features of
a traffic by sending fixed length packets and fixed intervals.
The only difference between TAMARAW and BuFLO is that
the former one performs more efficiently as it tunes packets
interval time based on volume of incoming and outgoing traffic,
i.e., giving higher packet rate to incoming and less to outgoing
flows. Although these countermeasures enjoy a very good
DiP, however, they enforce high overhead and timing delay
on network and are (as mentioned) unsuitable for bandwidth
starved scenarios such as Tor. Another more recent counter
measure is Glove by [22]. Glove considers traces as time series
data and clusters them based on DTW (dynamic time warping).
Then for each cluster, it creates a super trace. For any given
cluster, Glove morphs the trace into its clusters super trace and
then sends it. The comparison between different defenses can
be seen in Table II.
V. PROPOSED METHOD: TG-PSM
In this section, we introduce TG-PSM. The overall compo-
nents of TG-PSM is shown in Figure 1
5Defense OSI Layer(s) OF(s) Determinism Tunability BWO TD
PadR 3 PL No No Low None
PadMTU 3 PL Yes No No None
Mice/Elephant 3 PL No Static Low None
Traffic Morphing 3,7 PL No Static Medium None
Camouflage 7 PL,Ti No Static TSD None
HTTPOS 3,7 PL,Ti No Static Medium Medium
BuFLO 3 PL,Ti,PS Packet Level Static Very High Very High
TAMARAW 3 PL,Ti,PS Packet Level Static (2Way) High High
Glove 3,7 PL,Ti Cluster Level Static Low None
TG-PSM 3,7 PL,Ti,PS No Dynamic TSD Medium
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN WF DEFENSES.OF(S) REFERS TO THE FEATURES THAT DEFENSE TRIES TO OBFUSCATE. BWO IS BANDWIDTH OVERHEAD AND TD
IS TIMING DELAY. TSD REFERS TO TARGET SITE DEPENDENT.
Fig. 1. Overall components and respective steps in TG-PSM
A. Trace Morphing
In TG-PSM, trace morphing is the step in which the real
traffic trace generated by a user (Tsrc) is changed to look like
another trace (Tdst). Trace morphing is performed by changing
the size and timing of each packet of Tsrc. Morphing is done
by using TCP protocol features such as packet padding, packet
fragmentation, and packet delaying. We define source trace
(Tsrc) as the traffic trace generated by MU, destination trace
(Tdst) as the traffic trace chosen for Tsrc to morph into, and
Tout as the trace produced by applying TG-PSM algorithm to
Tsrc:
Tout = TG− PSM(Tsrc, Tdst, D, SimThres). (1)
Source trace is the result of user activities such as browsing
the web or downloading a file. Tsrc is not available at once
to the morphing algorithm. As a result, TG-PSM is designed
as a stream processing algorithm over traffic packets that may
only hold and delay a small number of packets at any time
during the morphing. Morphing is done on MU’s device such
that any adversary monitoring the traffic will only see Tout.
For each traffic flow, Tdst is selected based on Tsrc and the
IM specified by MU, such that detecting generated traffic as
Tdst has the least privacy implications for MU. Details of
selecting Tdst based on Tsrc and the tuning parameters (IM)
set by the user is discussed in section B. Morphing Tsrc to
Tdst is done considering overhead of morphing and similarity
of resulting trace (Tout) to Tdst. Therefore, Tout may not
completely resemble Tdst in order to maintain some constraints
on bandwidth overhead and timing delay. The goal function
and similarity measures used in determining such trade-offs
are discussed in part 2.
Another consideration regarding trace morphing is that local
behavior of traffic changes significantly during different stages.
For instance, retrieving a web page has stages like TCP and
HTTP connection establishment, sending request, receiving
main page, receiving page dependencies, and downloading
media contents. Since each stage of a trace has specific flow
characteristics, morphing all packets of a trace to another
trace may incur unnecessary bandwidth overhead and result
in insufficient information leakage protection. We suggest a
morphing approach in which source and destination traces are
split into a fixed number of slices, M , and each slice of Tsrc is
morphed to the corresponding slice in Tdst. In evaluating the
method, we consider different values for M , including M = 1,
that is the conventional morphing without slicing, from which
M = 10 was selected as the best candidate.
1) Greedy Packet Morphing: Greedy packet morphing is the
algorithm, which operates on a user’s device. This algorithm
changes each traffic trace produced by online activities of user
(Tsrc) on the fly minimizing the amount of information an
adversary can obtain from observing the output traffic (Tout).
It applies a greedy approach to determine how to change
each packet size and timing, with the goal of producing a
morphed trace that is similar to the selected Tdst, which is
selected by the target site designator subsystem. The incoming
and outgoing packets are interpreted and processed as two
independent streams, only with the constraint of preserving
the total timing order of packets among two streams. The
greediness is due to the fact that for each packet, algorithm
decides to either morph the packet or leave it unmodified
regardless of future packets and solely based on two values
of the goal function. Initially, Tdst is divided into M slices
each containing 1/M of total packets. Packets of Tsrc are also
grouped into M slices. Then, packets of each source slice
are morphed to be as similar as the packets of corresponding
destination slice with a reasonable overhead measured by the
goal function and SimThresh parameter. In this step, each
source packet is either changed to match size and timing of a
packet in target slice, or is passed unmodified. Matching target
trace packets improves similarity and passing reduces overhead,
and the decision for each packet is made using a goal function
establishing a trade-off between DiP and overhead. The goal
function is discussed in part 2.
6Algorithm 1: Trace Morphing in TG-PSM
input : Tsrc as an stream of packets, Tdst
output : Tout: Tsrc morphed in a way that will deceive
adversaries to detect it as Tdst
S ← Divide Tdst into M slices;
s← 0;
idst ← 0;
for each packet P in Tsrc do
if GFmorph(pass) > GFmorph(morph) then
SEND P unmodified;
else
SEND packetMorph(P, S[s][idst]);
idst ← idst + 1;
end
if moveToNewSlice(Tsrc) then
s← s+ 1;
idst ← 0;
end
if Ov > TrOv and GFsimilarity < SimThres then
Send packets of current slice in Tsrc unmodified;
s← s+ 1;
idst ← 0;
end
end
2) Overhead Controlling Criteria: A major concern in using
traffic anonymization PETs are the bandwidth overhead and
sending delays, that interfere with normal usage of users.
A high overhead may result in user abandoning the use of
PET completely (which results in zero protection against
adversaries). Thus ensuring a overhead limit for PETs will result
in more widespread use and improved total protection, even if
such constraints may reduce information hiding performance.
In our proposed method, we considered overhead implications
in all design decisions and used techniques to limit the overhead
incurred on resulting traffic. In particular, in determining how to
morph each packet and in when a trace slice is similar enough
to the target slice, we incorporated goal functions (overhead
controlling criteria) that take into account the overhead of each
action.
As shown in Algorithm 1, each packet in Tsrc is either
morphed or passed unmodified. This is decided by calculating
GFmorph for both cases and only morphing the packet if
the overhead introduced by morphing is justifiable with the
resulting increase in goal function value. The goal function is
defined as:
GFmorph =
k∑
i=0
dist(Tout[i], Tdst[i])− α
D
× Overhead. (2)
Where dist can be any similarity measure, for which we used
Jaccard coefficient, D is the parameter specifying sensitivity of
data (we used IM mod nClust as D), meaning the overhead
tolerance by MU for that particular website, and α is a balanc-
ing factor among similarity and overhead. The summation is
done over the part of traces already sent and the packets being
processed, denoted by the variable k.
Algorithm 2: Finding Target Site in TG-PSM
input : {< Tsrc, IM >}
for each T in {< Tsrc, IM >} do
if IM == 0 then
Tdst ← select a random instance from Csrc
else
i← Csrc;
j ← CD[i, IM ]
”Choosing IMth farthest cluster”
Cdst ← j;
Tdst ← select a random instance from Cdst;
end
end
output : {Tdst}
Additionally, for limiting the overhead, if the packets of one
of the two active slices is finished, morphing is only continued
until reaching a maximum similarity of output trace. This
criteria is checked in lines 15-19 of Algorithm 1, with the goal
function defined as:
GFsimilarity = dist(Tout, Tsrc). (3)
Both dist function and GFsimilarity use Jaccard coefficient
which in this context are defined as:
Generic Jaccard Coefficient :
A ∩B
A ∪B
In TG − PSM :
ti :< siteidi , psi > , tj :< siteidj , psj >
ti ∩ tj = {p | size(p) ∈ size(psi) ∧ size(p) ∈ size(psj)}
ti ∪ tj = {p | size(p) ∈ size(psi) ∨ size(p) ∈ size(psj)}
B. Finding Target Site and Tunability
As a prerequisite for every website morphing algorithm,
in addition to a Tsrc, which MU wants to hide, there
should be a Tdst. In TG-PSM, unlike Wright’s DTS
and TM that choses Tdst randomly, Tdst is chosen
according to the Tsrc and the IM provided by the MU.
Here, when the target site designator subsystem receives
< Tsrc, IM >, it choses the IM mod nClust farthest cluster
of websites and then randomly choses a website out of
that cluster. The extracted website is known as Tdst. Then,
< Tsrc, Tdst, IM mod nClust, SimThres > is passed to
the traffic morphing subsystem. The algorithm is shown in
algorithm 2.
1) Trace Representation: In order to cluster different web-
sites based on their behavior, we first needed a unified feature
space for all websites. For this purpose, two contributing factors
should be considered. First, how to exhibit a behavior of a
website and second, because each website can have multiple
traces, how to choose a single trace that best represents the
website. Based on these two challenges, we present our two-
step algorithm to represent a website.
Step 1: For each trace in our trace pool, we divide the trace
into M slices based on its packet count and calculate the mean
7Algorithm 3: Trace Feature Space and Candid Selection
input : WS,TR,TF
for each t in TR do
Divide t into M slices based on |t|;
for s in 1 :M do
consider slice sth;
Add < Meanup,Meandown > to FeatSpacet;
end
end
for each ws in WS do
Tr ← {T |siteid(T ) == ws};
for each t in Tr do
LOFt ← LOF (t);
end
Canws ← trace with min(LOF );
Add Canws to Cand;
end
output : Cand
size for incoming and outgoing packets. Hence each slice
is presented in the form of < Meanup,Meandown >. We
repeat this process for all M slices of each trace forming SRij
meaning feature vector for jth trace belonging to siteid = i.
Step 2: For all traces of a website, we calculate the local
outlier factor (LOF) [23] using its 2M feature space (M slices,
two measures from each). The trace with lowest LOF is
considered the candidate trace. The reason behind using LOF
is twofold. Firstly, because in the process of gathering traces
timeouts, broken connections and network partitioning are
possible. Hence, using mean or median instance is not suitable.
Secondly, LOF uses only the local instances to determine
the outliers. This attribute is crucial because a local outlier,
might not appear to be an outlier when all of the instances
are considered. Because of these two reasons, we believe LOF
choses the best trace as a candidate trace for each website.
Another important feature of this representation scheme is
that, this scheme demonstrates the behavior of any given trace
in M phases. Thus providing better accuracy and behavior
matching. The algorithm of this scheme is presented in
algorithm 3.
2) Clustering Instances: In this section, the desirable
attributes a practical clustering scheme in TG-PSM should
possess are discussed. In [17] Han et.al. introduced 11 attributes
useful in cluster analysis, however, here we only discuss the
ones we think are relevant to our framework .These attributes
are:
• High intra cluster similarity: for creating indistinguisha-
bility between target websites when choosing from the
same cluster, and also for predictive and controlled limit
of overhead when morphing to a cluster.
• Low inter cluster similarity: for creating distinguishable
target clusters, which in turn provides varied ranges and
options for tunability.
• Non-fuzzy membership: for creating separated target
clusters, which their overall estimation of the resulting
overhead if morphed to, are predicted beforehand.
Parameter Meaning Value
cCount Number of Clusters 10
sCount Number of Slices 10
D Tuning Factor 1,3,5,7,9
Alpha Bandwidth Impact Factor 0.01
BW-D-Factor Convert D to BW Threshold 25
SimThresh Min Similarity Two Slices 0.7
cAlgorithm Used Clustering Algorithm PAM10
t Training Set 16
T Testing Set 4
K Number of Websites to Morph 32,128
N Website Pool Size 775
TABLE III
USED PARAMETERS AND VALUES IN EVALUATION
• Resistant to noise: because of the noisy nature of internet
traffic, clustering in WF scenarios need to consider this
and maintain resilience against such cases.
• Scalability: in order for the solution to be widely used
and able to cope with high demands of morphing source
and targets.
Based on candid traces extracted in previous part, we
partition traces into mutually exclusive clusters. The used
feature space in this step in a 2M dimension, all numeric
vector for each candid trace. These 2M features are discussed
in previous sections. We slice each trace into M parts and for
each part calculate the mean-size of upstream and downstream
packets and add them as features. In order to choose the best
clustering algorithm and the best number of clusters to fully
demonstrate dynamic tunability, we cluster our Candid set of
traces using 5 different algorithms. These five algorithms [17]
are model-based clustering (MBC), partitioning around
medoids (PAM), self organizing maps (SOM), agglomerative
nesting (AGNES) and divisive hierarchical Clustering
(DIANA). In all these algorithm, number of clusters are
between 8 to 10. This decision is due to the fact that we
need to have enough cluster in order to show the impact of
dynamic tunability. After this step, we calculate 9 different
indexes for all 15 clustering outcomes [24], [25]. Out of this
9, 4 are stability measures, showing the quality of cluster if
one of the features are removed. The remaining 5 are internal
indexes, These indexes examine the compactness of each
cluster in addition to separability of them.The result of this
examinations can be seen in appendix1.
Finally, based on these measures and the 5 attributes mentioned
above and the calculated indexes, we choose PAM algorithm
with 10 clusters as the best scheme to demonstrate dynamic
tunability. The results in section VI all use PAM10 as default
clustering. The values of all 9 metrics for 15 algorithms are
presented in the Appendix
VI. EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Methodology
For all countermeasures except TG-PSM in accordance with
[1] , we randomly select k websites out Herrmann dataset.
For each of the k websites, we extract two subset of traces
8Fig. 2. DiP provided by different countermeasures with respect to bandwidth
overhead incurred, errors of all data points are less than 5% in each axis.
Exact details in Table IV
belonging to the same website: t, T , t as the training set and
T as the test set. For our trials, we set t and T to be 4 and 16,
respectively, where there are least 20 traces for that website.
In cases that 20 exceeds the total number of traces, 2 and
4 were used. The countermeasure is applied to each trace in
both subsets and then they were given to the classifier. The
accuracy is defined as ( cTk ) where c is the number of correctly
guessed traces. Each trial is repeated 10 times and the result
is the average accuracy. The only difference while evaluating
TG-PSM is that, because websites are clustered, t is chosen
from Csrc while T is chosen from the Cdst. These evaluation
methodology is compatible with the work of Dyer et.al. [1]
and is the literature standard for calculating the effectiveness
of WF attacks and defenses.
B. Experimental Setup
For evaluating our proposed method, TG-PSM, we have in-
corporated our method into the evaluation framework provided
by Dyer et.al. [1]. The final framework consists of following
components:
• Evaluation Routine this performs the sampling, training,
and testing of classifiers and countermeasures and calcu-
lates accuracy of the classifier and bandwidth and timing
overhead for the countermeasure being tested.
• Data Retrieval this provides an abstract layer for uniform
handling of different datasets and storage mechanisms,
in addition to a in-memory caching layer for improving
performance.
• Reference Implementations this contains a reference im-
plementation for a number of notable countermeasures
and classifiers.
Use of this framework enables us to test TG-PSM using
multiple existing datasets and attacks (traffic classifiers).
Additionally, it enabled us to compare the results to existing
countermeasures in an standard setup used by similar researches.
To fully integrate our method that contains clustering and
learning steps into this framework, we needed to make some
improvements to it. We implemented TG-PSM and added
it to the reference implementation component of framework,
introduced some refactoring and redesigns, and slightly modi-
fied the evaluation routine to incorporate extra needed steps
Fig. 3. Effect of changing D on DiP and overhead, reported as the percentage
of maximum observed value for each metric. The values of D are discrete and
the lines are only drawn for better interpretation.
and testing methods. Additionally, to compare the results
with similar cluster-based researches on the same dataset,
also we imported existing implementations or implemented
the countermeasures proposed in those researches. To verify
our version of implementations, we conducted experiments
similar to original researches and compared the results of our
implementation to the original reported results, which were
convincingly similar. Also, a test suite was developed for each
newly implemented countermeasure to verify the expected
behavior for some crafted traces. Then we used the verified
implementations to run extra experiments with varying universe
size and classifier-countermeasure combination and used the
results to compare with the results obtained for TG-PSM.
The results reported in next section are based on evaluating
countermeasures in discussed framework using the following
parameters: (List and values of all used parameters are shown
in Table III.)
• k=32/128. The traces used for training and testing are all
selected from these 2 different K-websites, forming the
privacy set. The size of privacy set used in our setup, k,
is 32/128, respectively.
• dataset=Herrmann. Main dataset used for selecting traces
is the Herrmann dataset [10], which is more recent than
other commonly used dataset provided by Liberatore [3]
and is likely to have less invalid traces [1].
• classifiers=HA,LL,PA. The three classification algorithms
used are those introduced by Herrmann et. al. (HA),
Liberatore and Levine (LL) [3], and Panchenko et. al.
(PA) [5]. The LL classifier provides a relatively fast
algorithm with acceptable accuracy rates, and the PA
classifier that usually performs best regarding to accuracy
among existing classifiers, however, is slower to run for
large traces and values of k [1].
C. Results
In this section we provide a summary of the results obtained
from evaluating various countermeasures in the setup explained
in the previous section. Two of the main concerns regarding
PETs are DiP and the incurred overhead, which are usually
related. In figure 2, each point represents a traffic analysis
9Countermeasure Parameter overhead Classifier Accuracy
Traffic Morphing SimThresh = 0.7 69.8 25.78± 0.9
BuFLO τ = 0, ρ = 40, d = 1000 96.6 20.7
BuFLO τ = 0, ρ = 20, d = 1500 147.0 15.3
BuFLO τ = 10000, ρ = 40, d = 1000 183.7 16.2
BuFLO τ = 10000, ρ = 20, d = 1000 347.2 8.1
TAMARAW L1 84.3 22.2± 0.7
TAMARAW L2 251.0 4.9± 0.3
TGPSM D = 1 90.3 14.63± 0.8
TGPSM D = 3 122.7 13.90± 1.1
TGPSM D = 5 133.1 10.60± 0.4
TGPSM D = 7 146.6 9.2± 0.6
TGPSM D = 9 155.2 7.6± 1.5
TGPSM D = 9, sα = 1 206.9 4.0± 1.0
TABLE IV
OVERHEAD AND ACCURACY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST LL CLASSIFIER AT K=128 ON HERRMANN DATASET
Countermeasure Parameter overhead Classifier Accuracy
Traffic Morphing SimThresh = 0.7 58 5.71± 1.8
BuFLO τ = 0, ρ = 40, d = 1000 95.7 3.4± 2.1
BuFLO τ = 0, ρ = 20, d = 1500 137 5.3± 0.2
BuFLO τ = 10000, ρ = 40, d = 1000 131.6 4.8± 0.3
BuFLO τ = 10000, ρ = 20, d = 1000 293 1± 0.8
TAMARAW L1 85.2 5.7± 0.3
TAMARAW L2 254.4 1± 0.8
TGPSM D = 1 91.5 4.3± 0.8
TGPSM D = 3 123.2 3.2± 0.8
TGPSM D = 5 134.1 1± 0.8
TGPSM D = 7 146.3 1± 0.8
TGPSM D = 9 156.9 1± 0.8
TGPSM D = 9, α = 1 211.6 1± 0.8
TABLE V
OVERHEAD AND ACCURACY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST HA CLASSIFIER AT K=128 ON HERRMANN DATASET
Countermeasure Parameter overhead Classifier Accuracy
Traffic Morphing SimThresh = 0.7 41 88.8± 0.8
BuFLO τ = 0, ρ = 40, d = 1000 94.8 29.3± 1.9
BuFLO τ = 0, ρ = 20, d = 1500 137 23.9± 2.4
BuFLO τ = 10000, ρ = 40, d = 1000 131.5 12.1± 2.1
BuFLO τ = 10000, ρ = 20, d = 1000 323 8.3± 0.4
TAMARAW L1 86 25.6± 1.1
TAMARAW L2 252.9 9.6± 1.5
TGPSM D = 1 86.7 18.2± 0.3
TGPSM D = 3 126.3 23.5± 1.3
TGPSM D = 5 131.7 21.2± 0.6
TGPSM D = 7 145.1 19.2± 1.1
TGPSM D = 9 169.3 15.8± 0.9
TGPSM D = 9, α = 1 209.49 9.7± 0.8
TABLE VI
OVERHEAD AND ACCURACY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PA CLASSIFIER AT K=128 ON HERRMANN DATASET
countermeasure with parameters set to specific values, as
defined in Table III. Points with lower accuracy values are
suitable for use in cases where the traffic is sensitive and high
overhead can be tolerated to achieve higher levels of security,
whereas points with lower overhead values are more likely
to be used by casual users with modest anonymity needs. In
the bottom right section it can be observed that allowing a
level of overhead, TG-PSM can provide protection comparable
to algorithms with proven security like TAMARAW (T2) [4]
and BuFLO (B4). With lowering the overhead tolerance, TG-
PSM starts to outperform similar countermeasures with same
accuracy-overhead characteristics. Also, it is noticeable that TG-
PSM can cover a wide range of MU security and performance
requirements using only simple modifications to the tune
parameter D.
A key element in TG-PSM is the easy tunability of the
algorithm by MU, which boosts its usability for users. The
effect of tuning parameter D in the resulting DiP and overhead
is shown in figure 3. The two curves corresponds to DiP
and overhead metrics, and the percentage for each value of
D = D0 is the ratio of metric for TGPSM(D = D0) to the
highest value of that metric. Generally, as D increases, DiP
improves and as a result the accuracy of traffic classification is
decreases, with a proportional increase in bandwidth overhead.
This predictable behavior of TG-PSM with altering D can help
users to tune the algorithm easily using only the parameter D
to achieve the level of protection required for each browsing
session. The five instances of TG-PSM shown in figure 2
as TGPSM1, TGPSM2, TGPSM3, TGPSM4, TGPSM5,
TGPSM6 correspond to values 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and (9, α = 1)
for D.
As an extra observation, we have separately measured the
overhead of applying TG-PSM to traces of different total size
in terms of aggregate packet length for different classes of
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trace lengths. We observe that for the traces with packet count
of less than 1000 packets and total size of less than 10MB,
the overhead is roughly 15 ± 4% less in average, and up to
25± 4% for traces with fewer than 500 packets. Consequently,
we expect the real-word values of overhead imposed by TG-
PSM on traffic traces to be noticeably less than the values
reported above using the trace datasets, due to the fact that
in common browsing experience traces are more probable to
be of smaller sizes. More detailed results of our evaluation is
presented in the Appendix.
D. Comparison to Similar Algorithms
The TG-PSM algorithm has two family of similar algorithms,
one consisting of morphing-based algorithms and the other
consisting of clustering-based countermeasures. Due to the use
of clustering for selecting morphing target and use of overhead
controlling criteria, TG-PSM outperforms the algorithms of
first family as well as algorithms designed to protect against
ideal attackers [4], in terms of DiP, overhead, or both. This
comparison was done in more details in evaluation results in
the previous section. Glove countermeasure [22], based on
the similar idea of clustering websites for more intelligent
adding of cover traffic to original traces, can represent the
second family of algorithms. By comparing [22] and [4], we
concluded that against PA classifier, TAMARAW performs
better and enjoys higher DiP. For this reason, we compare
TG=PSM with TAMARAW empirically and only discuss the
difference between TG-PSM and Glove. TG-PSM differs from
Glove in following main aspects:
Fine-grained tunability: Using the tune parameter and the
overhead controlling criteria, users can precisely choose the
level of protection they need for each group of websites or
each browsing session. Also, it helps users to impose a level of
maximum tolerance for overhead based on available resources.
The tunability can be done dynamically by the user for each
use and does not require pre-computation of clusters.
Traffic sectioning: Due to the differences of traffic behavior
in different phases of network protocols, for example the
process of retrieving a webpage and its resources or handshakes
and initial data transfers common in protocols, we have used
a technique based on sectioning the traffic traces into multiple
phases. This sectioning technique creates distinct morphing
results that improves the efficiency of TG-PSM.
Morphing-based approach: Glove uses the clustering as
a basis for adding cover traffic to achieve comparable results
with lower bandwidth overhead compared to algorithms like
BuFLO. This approach can be seen as a kind of smart alteration
of countermeasures like PadMTU that focus on covering the
important aspects of traffic. In contrast, TG-PSM aims to
mislead the traffic analysis efforts by changing the original
traces to traces similar to other real traffic, selected in a way
that provides the most confusion in traffic classification.
VII. DISCUSSION
A. Open-World and Close-World
In the course of this work, all trials are in close-world
environment. In close-world environment, the attacker has a
list of interesting websites and would like to know which one
MU is visited. Also, the MU does not visit any website outside
this list. In open-world environments on the other hand, MU
can visit sites outside the interested list and attacker would
like to know if any of interesting websites are visited. We
believe because close-world environments favor the attacker,
the countermeasures that we evaluate, will improve in open-
world environments; hence, however effective countermeasures
such as TG-PSM are in our evaluation, their open-world
performance will be much better. In 2014 Juarez et. al. [15]
showed the difference between classifier accuracy in these
two environments and argued that in multi tab scenarios the
accuracy of Dyer’s N-grams classifier can be reduced by a
drastic margin.
B. Website Behavior in Different Phases of Trace
As was proven by Panchenko’s classifier, packet sequence
behavior features are able to leak a great amount of information
from traffic. They are also the reason for the failure of
most of previous countermeasures. We believe a successful
countermeasure should be able to detect and hide this class of
features. As a requirement for this, a good representation of
website behavior in different phases of loading and responding
is required. In this paper, we used a 20-fold feature space that
inspected this behavior in 10 phases each represented by 2
metric.
C. Misleading Rather Than Confusing
With regard to the countermeasure effect on classifier,
there are two main approaches: Confusing and Misleading.
In confusing approach, the classifier doesn’t detect the right
website and produces false prediction. Misleading on the other
hand, fools the classifier into thinking another website was
visited. The second approach (which is used by morphing
countermeasure family such as TG-PSM) is specially useful
in situation with white-list policy enforcements, where only a
list of predetermined applications are allowed and the rest are
banned.
D. Correct Methodology for Analyzing Defense Capabilities
The common methodology for evaluating the DiP of WF
attacks is that classifier is both trained on t and T while both
are countermeasure applied. This methodology suggests that
either attacker knows the countermeasure mechanism or gathers
the To in MU’s environment. We believe this assumption is not
always right and is one of the reasons for poor performance
of WF countermeasures. Although for compatibility with the
literature in this field, we used the common methodology, in
our opinion the right way must be that classifier is trained on
website traffic without the counter measure (t) and is tested
with the countermeasure applied traffic (T ).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a website fingerprinting coun-
termeasure referred to as TG-PSM, which is designed to
mislead the attacker into detecting false websites as the actual
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visited website of a user. TG-PSM morphs the traffic while
considering the importance of the particular instance and the
overall affordable bandwidth for that instance by the user.
While previous countermeasures have proven to be inadequate
and/or overly costly, we designed and implemented TG-PSM
with the following attributes:
Morphing rather than uniformization: Uniformization
countermeasures, although proven effective, suffer from high
enforced bandwidth overhead and timing delay. Also, they fail
to hide the proportional size of the trace, which can be used
by packet sequence features. In TG-PSM, we use morphing
approach that attempts to to mislead the attacker into detecting
the wrong visited website.
Dynamic tunability: TG-PSM tunes its DiP and enforced
bandwidth overhead bases on real-time user preferences. This
feature is due to the fact that in the initial morphing process,
TG-PSM chooses a target site which it believes will match the
affordable overhead and desired DiP by the user.
On-the-fly greedy stream morphing: While previous mor-
phing countermeasures needed the packet size distribution of
source website, TG-PSM morphs the packet on the fly using
a greedy algorithm which considers the created DiP and the
resulting bandwidth overhead. This attribute results in more
widespread use and better coverage for different website and
if used, various applications.
Our evaluation results show that TG-PSM performs bet-
ter than the previous morphing and uniformization website
fingerprinting countermeasures both in the DiP and enforced
bandwidth, e.g. providing better DiP while mainainig band-
width overhead for D=1 and Providing better overhead while
maintaining the same DiP for D=9 in k=128 situations.
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